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Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables unconditionally secure communication ensured by the
laws of physics, opening a promising route to security infrastructure for the coming age of quantum
computers. QKD’s demonstrated secret-key rates (SKRs), however, fall far short of the gigabit-per-
second rates of classical communication, hindering QKD’s widespread deployment. QKD’s low SKRs
are largely due to existing single-photon-based protocols’ vulnerability to channel loss. Floodlight
QKD (FL-QKD) boosts SKR by transmitting many photons per encoding, while offering security
against collective attacks. Here, we report an FL-QKD experiment operating at a 1.3 Gbit/s SKR
over a 10-dB-loss channel. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first QKD demonstration that
achieves a gigabit-per-second-class SKR, representing a critical advance toward high-rate QKD at
metropolitan-area distances.
Shor’s algorithm [1] for polynomial-time prime fac-
torization on a quantum computer poses an existen-
tial threat to public-key cryptography, and hence to
present-day Internet commerce. Quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) [2] provides means to ward off this threat
by enabling remote parties (Alice and Bob) to estab-
lish a secret key, comprised of a shared set of random
bits, with security that is guaranteed by the laws of
physics. Using that key as a one-time pad (OTP), Alice
and Bob can then exchange messages with information-
theoretic security. The appeal of unconditionally se-
cure communication spurred the recent demonstration of
ground-satellite QKD [3], a first step toward a global
quantum-communication network. A major barrier to
QKD’s widespread deployment, however, is QKD sys-
tems’ low secret-key rates (SKRs). For the predomi-
nant decoy-state BB84 protocol, which transmits single-
photon-level signals to ensure security, channel loss leads
to state-of-the-art SKRs in the megabit-per-second class
over metropolitan-distance fiber connections [4]. Chan-
nel loss has a similar effect on traditional continuous-
variable QKD (CV-QKD), whose state-of-the-art SKRs
[5] are lower than those of BB84. These systems are thus
incapable of supporting OTP encryption for gigabit-per-
second Internet traffic without dramatic increases in their
SKRs, such as might be obtained, e.g., by developing fast
and high-efficiency single-photon detectors [6], introduc-
ing wavelength-division multiplexing [7], and employing
ultra-low-loss fibers [8]. Even so, their use of single-
mode encodings imposes the fundamental − log2(1 − η)
bits-per-optical-mode SKR bound for a transmissivity-η
channel [9, 10] on their SKRs in bits/sec.
Floodlight QKD (FL-QKD) is a radically different pro-
tocol that was shown, theoretically, to offer gigabit-per-
second-class SKRs over metropolitan-area distances us-
ing only available technology [11]. It does so by trans-
mitting many photons per bit—just as is done in clas-
sical communication—while obeying the rate-loss bound
on SKR in bits/mode by using multi-mode encoding to
achieve its high SKR in bits/sec. We previously reported
an FL-QKD experiment operating at 55 Mbit/s SKR
over a 10-dB-loss channel with security against collective
attacks [12], representing a ∼50-fold improvement over
state-of-the-art. Here, we report an FL-QKD experiment
that further boosts the SKR by ∼20 times, achieving a
1.3 Gbit/s SKR over a 10-dB-loss channel. Our exper-
iment, to the best of our knowledge, is the first QKD
system operating at a gigabit-per-second SKR.
FL-QKD, illustrated in Fig. 1, is a two-way continuous-
variable protocol that leverages a broadband incoher-
ent source for key distribution, whose optical bandwidth
W greatly exceeds the inverse of its encoding time T ,
so that each bit is carried on multiple photons that
are spread over M = TW  1 optical modes. It
also employs a photon-pair source, together with three
single-photon detectors, that enable Alice and Bob to
quantify quantum-channel intrusion by their adversary
(Eve). In particular, Alice utilizes an amplified sponta-
neous emission (ASE) source to generate high-brightness
( 1 photon/mode) broadband light. She then splits
the broadband light using a highly-reflecting beam split-
ter and retains the light from the reflecting arm for use
as her homodyne receiver’s reference beam. In addition
to the broadband classical source, Alice uses a sponta-
neous parametric down-converter (SPDC) to generate
time-correlated signal and idler photons. She immedi-
ately detects and time tags her SPDC’s idler photons us-
ing a single-photon detector. She makes her SPDC’s sig-
nal photons, which obey thermal statistics, indistinguish-
able from her ASE photons by forcing their spectra and
polarizations to be identical. Alice combines her SPDC’s
signal photons with the ASE photons from the weakly-
transmitting arm of her initial beam splitter on another
unbalanced beam splitter. Next, she taps, detects, and
time tags a small portion of her mixed beam using a
second single-photon detector. Alice’s two single-photon
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2FIG. 1: Schematic of FL-QKD under Eve’s optimum collective attack. Light from Alice’s broadband (SPDC) source is marked
by solid black (green) lines; Eve’s injected light is marked by dashed red lines. The channel monitor consists of the three single-
photon detectors in red boxes. Only Alice’s SPDC photons (solid green) at Bob’s detector are coincident with her idler photons,
whereas Eve’s injected photons (dashed red) contribute only to the noise background in coincidence measurements. As such,
Eve’s injection fraction fE at Bob’s terminal can be derived by measuring the coincidences versus singles rates at Alice and
Bob’s detectors. Not shown: classical channel used for reconciliation.
detectors comprise her part of the channel-monitor sys-
tem that she and Bob use to quantify Eve’s intrusion
on their quantum channel, as explained below. Alice
transmits the rest of her mixed beam—which consists of
low-brightness ( 1 photon/mode) ASE light containing
much more than 1 photon per bit duration T , plus much
lower brightness SPDC signal light—to Bob through a
quantum channel that is completely under Eve’s control.
Note that no information has been encoded at this stage.
Bob first detects and time tags a small portion of the
light he receives using a beam splitter and his own single-
photon detector, which constitute his part of the channel
monitor. Bob then applies binary phase-shift keying—
0 Rad or piRad phase shift at rate R = 1/T  W
bits/sec—to impose random bit-stream modulation on
the rest of the light. Next, he amplifies his encoded light
with a high-gain optical amplifier, which brings with it
three major benefits [11, 12]: (1) it compensates for the
return-path loss to Alice, so despite FL-QKD’s being a
two-way protocol its SKR only suffers the propagation
loss of the Alice-to-Bob path; (2) it adds high-brightness
noise to Bob’s amplified encoded light, completely mask-
ing his random bit-string from a passive eavesdropper;
and (3) it obviates Alice’s need to have a shot-noise lim-
ited homodyne detector—something that traditional CV-
QKD requires—because the added noise greatly exceeds
the shot-noise level. Bob sends his encoded and ampli-
fied light to Alice, through a channel controlled by Eve,
and Alice decodes his random bit-stream with a homo-
dyne receiver that uses her retained reference beam as its
local oscillator (LO).
Eve is assumed to collect all the light that was lost
in the Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Alice channels. Eve’s
passive-eavesdropping attack, in which she just makes use
of that lost light, is rendered impotent by the no-cloning
theorem, which precludes her from regenerating Alice’s
high-brightness reference from the low-brightness version
she captured from the Alice-to-Bob channel. Without
such a reference, Eve cannot penetrate the amplifier noise
in which Bob’s bit-stream is buried. A two-way QKD
protocol, like FL-QKD, is vulnerable to an active attack
[13–19], in which Eve injects some of her own light into
Bob’s terminal, and decodes Bob’s bit-stream using her
own stored reference. FL-QKD’s SPDC and its three
single-photon detectors, however, provide sufficient chan-
nel monitoring to quantify and hence defeat Eve’s active
attack. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the coincidences rates be-
tween Alice and Bob’s tapped photons and the idler pho-
tons are measured using the three single-photon detectors
embedded in red boxes. Only the green signal beams
contain photons from the SPDC source that lead to co-
incidences events with the idler photons. Eve’s photons
marked in red are uncorrelated with the SPDC’s pho-
tons and thus only contribute to the noise background in
the coincidence measurements [12]. As such, the singles
versus coincidences rates observed by the three single-
photon detectors not only unveil Eve’s intrusion, but also
quantify the fraction fE of light reaching Bob’s termi-
nal that she injected. Knowledge of fE allows Alice and
Bob to put an upper bound on Eve’s Holevo informa-
tion. Ref. [11] shows that the active injection attack is
the most powerful collective Gaussian attack and, more
generally, represents the most powerful collective attack
in the frequency domain. A more recent theoretical study
[20] elaborates the use of limited entanglement-assisted
channel capacity to prove that Gaussian attacks are the
optimum for a broad class of two-way QKD protocols.
Figure 2 shows a schematic of our experiment. An
unseeded erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) emits
∼200 mW of unpolarized broadband ASE light. We
3FIG. 2: Experimental setup. EDFA: erbium-doped fiber amplifier; CWDM: coarse wavelength-division multiplexer; BPSK:
binary-phase shift keying; LO: local oscillator; SPD: single-photon detector. There was no light injection by Eve.
first polarize the ASE light using an inline polarizer and
filter it with a coarse wavelength-division multiplexer
(CWDM) into a ∼18-nm (2.24 THz) band centered at
1550 nm, before splitting it into two portions with a 90:10
coupler. The strong ASE portion is retained by Alice in a
spool of fibers (including some dispersion-compensating
fiber) to serve as the LO for her homodyne receiver. The
weak ASE portion from the coupler output is further at-
tenuated by a variable optical attenuator (not shown)
and then spectrally shaped using a programmable op-
tical filter (Finisar Waveshaper 1000S, not shown) that
modifies its spectrum so that it becomes indistinguish-
able from that of the SPDC’s light. Moreover, the Wave-
Shaper imposes frequency-dependent phase shifts to the
ASE light to fine tune its dispersion characteristics. This
technique is particularly useful for compensating high-
order dispersion that cannot be effectively corrected by
conventional dispersion-compensating fibers. The ASE
light is later combined with the SPDC’s signal light for
transmission to Bob.
The SPDC source is a type-0 phase-matched MgO-
doped periodically-poled lithium niobate (MgO:PPLN)
crystal pumped by a ∼1-mW 780-nm beam, produc-
ing signal and idler photons centered at 1550 nm and
1570 nm, respectively. After the crystal the pump is
blocked by two long-pass dichroic filters (not shown), and
the signal and idler photons are coupled into a single-
mode fiber and then separated with a CWDM filter,
resulting in 1.28 pW signal and idler beams. The idler
photons are immediately detected by a superconducting
nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) and their de-
tection times are recorded. A 98:2 fiber tap combines
the signal photons (via the 98% port) and the weak ASE
light (via the 2% port). Alice taps 2% of the combined
light, detects the tapped photons with a second SNSPD,
and records their detection times. She sends the remain-
ing 98% of the combined light to Bob through a fiber
channel with 10-dB attenuation.
Bob first taps 1% from the received broadband light,
detects photons in that tapped light using a third
SNSPD, and records the detection times. The remaining
light passes through a circulator (not shown) to block
back-propagating light, a CWDM filter (not shown) to
reject out-of-band signal, and is then polarization tuned
via a paddle (not shown). An EDFA then supplies a
∼30 dB gain to compensate for the loss to be incurred
on the return channel to Alice. The total device inser-
tion loss at Bob’s terminal before the EDFA is 4.7 dB.
The amplified broadband light is phase modulated by an
electro-optic modulator (EOM) using binary-phase shift
keying with a 7 Gbit/s pseudorandom sequence provided
by a bit-error-rate tester. The EOM’s embedded polar-
izer blocks the cross-polarized noise photons. Bob sends
the amplified and modulated light back to Alice through
another fiber channel.
Placing the EOM after the EDFA overcomes the
EOM’s insertion loss. However, the amplified input to
the EOM means that even a small amount of residual
amplitude modulation can potentially allow Eve to ob-
tain the bit values by simply measuring amplitude vari-
ations in the light Bob sends to Alice. A solution to
overcoming the EOM’s insertion loss without this vul-
nerability is to sandwich the EOM between two EDFAs,
with the first EDFA having just enough gain to make the
insertion loss inconsequential. Residual amplitude mod-
ulation (typically no more than a few %) will then be
quite weak relative to the shot noise that will be seen by
Eve.
Alice fine tunes the signal’s round-trip propagation de-
lay using a free-space delay line so that it matches the
length of the fiber spool that stores her LO. In the ho-
modyne measurement, the ASE portion of the returned
light interferes with the retained LO at a 50:50 coupler,
whose two outputs are fed to a balanced receiver (Discov-
ery Semiconductors) with 14-GHz bandwidth and ∼55%
quantum efficiency. The balanced receiver’s electrical
output signal is amplified by a 44-dB-gain low-noise am-
plifier. The photodetection noise power primarily stems
from the ASE photons created by Bob’s EDFA; it is >15
dB higher than the shot-noise limit and >25 dB higher
4than the electrical noise floor, as confirmed by an elec-
trical spectrum analyzer. Moreover, the electrical noise
power is proportional to the signal power owing to Bob’s
EDFA. Hence, FL-QKD does not require a high-efficiency
shot-noise limited homodyne measurement [11], whereas
traditional CV-QKD does.
A power splitter divides the electrical signal into two
outputs. One is directed to the bit-error-rate tester, and
the other output is rectified and fed to a lock-in amplifier
for compensating the phase drift caused by differential
thermal fluctuations between the signal and the reference
paths. To do so, we implement a dither-and-lock servo
using a 102 kHz sinusoidal dither generated by the lock-in
amplifier. The servo’s error signal at the lock-in ampli-
fier output is first processed by a PID-controller, then
summed with the dither, before being combined with the
EOM’s driving input at a bias-T and fed to the EOM.
Two essential parameters are needed to determine the
SKR: Alice’s bit-error probability Pe and Eve’s injection
fraction fE . We measured Pe at different transmitted
photons per bit with fixed source bandwidth. In each
case, a set of 10 consecutive Pe’s were recorded and their
standard deviations calculated. We measured fE using
the channel monitor comprised of the three SNSPDs and
a time-tagging device (Picoquant Hydraharp). The idler
photons’ detection times served as the synchronization
signal for the Hydraharp’s histogram measurements. The
detection times of Alice’s and Bob’s tapped photons were
recorded by two Hydraharp channels. Choosing a coinci-
dence window of 3.2 ns, the histograms allow us to deter-
mine the singles rate at Alice’s tap SA, the singles rate
at Bob’s tap SB , the time-aligned (time-misaligned) co-
incidence rate between Alice’s tap and the SPDC’s idler
CIA (C˜IA), and the time-aligned (time-misaligned) co-
incidence rate between Bob’s tap and the SPDC’s idler
CIB (C˜IB). The injection fraction fE is then determined
from [11, 21]
fE = 1− CIB − C˜IB
CIA − C˜IA
× SA
SB
. (1)
As discussed in [11] and verified in [12], fE is independent
of the SNSPDs’ quantum efficiencies, the channel trans-
missivity, and the source brightness. The channel moni-
tor is thus calibration free. We performed 54 30-minute
histogram measurements, giving fE = (0.053± 0.066)%.
After accounting for a 3-σ confidence level for the mea-
surement uncertainty, we obtained the upper bound
fUBE = 0.3% on Eve’s injection fraction.
With Pe’s and fE measured, the SKRs are derived from
SKR = R
[
βIAB(Pe)− χBE(fUBE )
]
. (2)
Here, R = 7 Gbit/s is the modulation rate, β = 0.94
is the assumed reconciliation efficiency, IAB(Pe) = 1 +
Pe log2(Pe) + (1 − Pe) log2(1 − Pe) is Alice and Bob’s
bits/use mutual information, and χBE(f
UB
E ) is the upper
bound on Eve’s bits/use Holevo information set by fUBE
[11]. We plot in Fig. 3 the theoretical curves for IAB(Pe)
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FIG. 3: SKR (solid black) in Gbit/s, and IAB(Pe) (solid
blue) and χBE(fE) (dashed brown) in bits/use versus Alice’s
transmitted photons per bit. Solid red circles are experimen-
tal values, with error bars (±1 standard deviation) that are
mostly covered by the red circles.
(solid blue), χBE(f
UB
E ) (dashed brown), and the SKRs
(solid black) at different transmitted photons per bit.
The experimentally measured values are shown as red
circles. The experimental measurements agree well with
theory at transmitted photons per bit < 30, where the
phase-locking servo loop was optimized. At higher levels,
the experimental data are slightly lower than the theo-
retical model due to sub-optimum servo loop operation.
The maximum SKR is 1.3 Gbit/s, obtained at ∼20 trans-
mitted photons per bit—or, equivalently, ∼5.8×10−4 bit
per optical mode obtained at ∼0.06 photon per opti-
cal mode—over a 10-dB-attenuation channel for which
− log2(1− η) = 0.15 bit/mode.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated FL-QKD with
1.3 Gbit/s SKR. This high SKR is made possible by FL-
QKD’s multi-mode encoding scheme in a two-way com-
munication system, which enables transmission of many
photons per bit to overcome channel loss while maintain-
ing security. Future investigations along this line would
encompass demonstrating FL-QKD in a field test, study-
ing finite-size effects, and developing broadband QKD
protocols in a networked setting.
This work was funded by the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research (AFOSR) under Grant Number
FA9550-14-1-0052 and the Office of Naval Research
(ONR) under Contract Number N00014-16-C-2069. The
authors thank S. W. Nam, D. Zhu, and Q. Zhao for
support on SNSPDs, and E. Wong for generating the
three-dimensional experimental schematic.
5[1] P. W. Shor, SIAM J. Comput. 26, 1484 (1997).
[2] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems, and
Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York,
1984), p. 175.
[3] S.-K. Liao et al., Nature 549, 43–47 (2017).
[4] L. C. Comandar et al., Appl. Phys. Lett. 104, 021101
(2014).
[5] D. Huang, D. Lin, C. Wang, W. Liu, S. Fang, J. Peng,
P. Huang, and G. Zeng, Opt. Express 23, 17511 (2015).
[6] F. Marsili et al., Nat. Photon. 7, 210–214 (2013).
[7] K.-i. Yoshino, T. Ochi, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, and A.
Tajima, Opt. Express 21, 31395 (2013).
[8] B. Korzh et al., Nat. Photon. 9, 163 (2015).
[9] M. Takeoka, S. Guha, and M. M. Wilde, Nat. Commun.
5, 5235 (2014).
[10] S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani, and L. Banchi,
Nat. Commun. 8, 15043 (2017).
[11] Q. Zhuang, Z. Zhang, J. Dove, F. N. C. Wong, and J. H.
Shapiro, Phys. Rev. A. 94, 012322 (2016).
[12] Z. Zhang, Q. Zhuang, F. N. C. Wong, and J. H. Shapiro,
Phys. Rev. A 95, 012332 (2017).
[13] K. Bostro¨m and T. Felbinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89,
187902 (2002).
[14] F.-G. Deng and G. L. Long, Phys. Rev. A 69, 052319
(2004).
[15] S. Pirandola, S. Mancini, S. Lloyd, and S. L. Braunstein,
Nat. Phys. 4, 726 (2008).
[16] J. H. Shapiro, Phys. Rev. A 80, 022320 (2009).
[17] Z. Zhang, M. Tengner, T. Zhong, F. N. C. Wong, and J.
H. Shapiro, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 010501 (2013).
[18] J. H. Shapiro, Z. Zhang, and F. N. C. Wong, Quantum
Inf. Process. 13, 2171 (2014).
[19] C. Weedbrook, C. Ottaviani, and S. Pirandola, Phys.
Rev. A 89, 012309 (2014).
[20] Q. Zhuang, E. Y. Zhu, P. W. Shor, Phys. Rev. Lett. 118,
200503 (2017).
[21] See Supplemental Material for more information about
the channel monitor.
[22] M. Shaw, K. Birnbaum, M. Cheng, M. Srinivasan, K.
Quirk, J. Kovalik, A. Biswas, A. D. Beyer, F. Marsili, V.
Verma, R. P. Mirin, S. W. Nam, J. A. Stern, and W. H.
Farr, CLEO paper SM4J–2 (2014).
Supplemental Material
We monitored the Alice-to-Bob channel to measure Eve’s injection fraction, fE , in order to bound Eve’s Holevo
information. The measured fE is calculated from [11]
fE = 1− CIB − C˜IB
CIA − C˜IA
× SA
SB
, (3)
where SA is the singles rate at Alice’s tap, SB is the singles rate at Bob’s tap, CIA (C˜IA) is the time-aligned
(time-misaligned) coincidence rate between Alice’s tap and the SPDC’s idler, and CIB (C˜IB) is the time-aligned
(time-misaligned) coincidence rate between Bob’s tap and the SPDC’s idler. Time-aligned coincidences are due to
both the SPDC’s signal photons and Alice’s ASE light, whereas the time-misaligned coincidences result only from
ASE light.
We performed channel-monitoring measurements under the operating conditions that gave the 1.3 Gbit/s SKR:
SPDC signal and idler powers of ∼1.28 pW after Alice’s CWDM, a received ASE power of 1.47 nW before Bob’s
EDFA, and no light injection by Eve. Our WSi SNSPDs begin to saturate at ∼1 Mcounts/s, and have ∼4 Mcounts/s
maximum count rates. Their effective quantum efficiencies drop, due to blocking loss, as they are pushed deeper
into their saturation regimes. Our channel-monitor measurement duration was therefore primarily determined by
the SNSPDs’ maximum count rate. For the SPDC’s idler counts, the effective quantum efficiency was ∼40% at
∼4 Mcounts/s. Alice and Bob’s tapped light is ASE plus a much weaker signal component from Alice’s SPDC, so
we attenuated the tapped beams prior to detection to prevent deeply saturating the SNSPDs. Using ∼29 dB (20 dB)
attenuation for Alice’s (Bob’s) tap, we kept the singles rates comparable to that for Alice’s idler channel. Note that
timing jitter increases in the SNSPDs’ saturation regime. Hence, to count all SPDC coincidences, it is necessary to
choose an appropriate coincidence window.
Operating our channel monitor’s SNSPDs at ∼4 Mcounts/s meant that we needed 54 30-minute-long measurements
to obtain adequate signal-to-noise ratio. Our fE values—calculated from the channel monitor’s detection-time data
using Eq. (3)—are plotted in Fig. 4 versus the coincidence-window duration. Decreasing the coincidence window
below 3.2 ns leads to uncounted SPDC coincidences, resulting in increasing fE estimates, despite there being no light
injection by Eve. Coincidence windows between 3.2 ns and 10 ns, however, yielded fE estimates close to the true value
with similar standard deviations. Therefore, to faithfully estimate fE , we chose a 3.2 ns coincidence window and,
combining all 54 30-minute measurements, we obtained fE = (0.053 ± 0.066)% for the estimated injection fraction,
where the uncertainty is ±1 standard error, i.e., the standard deviation for a 30-minute measurement divided by √54.
The measurement time needed to obtain the preceding channel-monitor performance was quite long, but it can
be significantly reduced if high-count-rate SNSPDs are employed. For example, the SNSPDs used in [22] have
6FIG. 4: Calculated values for Eve’s injection fraction, fE , versus coincidence-window duration. Each solid red circle is the
average of 54 30-minute measurements, and the associated error bars are the estimated ± 1 standard deviation for a 30-minute
measurement.
14 Mcounts/s maximum count rates and 20% effective quantum efficiencies. Using these detectors, we estimate that
our 30-minute-long measurement time can be reduced to 25 s, by pumping our SPDC crystal ∼7× harder to realize
a 14 Mcounts/s idler-beam singles rate.
